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U.S. Births Remain Low as the Great Recession Wanes
More Than Three Million Fewer Births and Still Counting
Kenneth M. Johnson

T

he Great Recession sent an economic shock
through American society that reached far beyond
the stock and housing markets. More than five
years after economists announced the end of the recession, fertility levels have still not recovered. As a result,
more than 3.4 million fewer babies were born in the
United States between 2008 and 2015 than would have
been expected if pre-recession fertility rates had been
sustained (see Figure 1). In each of the last five years, this
birth deficit has resulted in roughly 500,000 fewer births.

FIGURE 1. ACTUAL BIRTHS COMPARED TO BIRTHS USING
2007 BIRTH RATES, 2008 TO 2015

Analysis: K.M. Johnson, Carsey School, University of New Hampshire
Source: National Center for Health Statistics

Nor do new data just released show any evidence of an
upturn in births. National Center for Health Statistics data
for 2015 show the lowest general fertility rate on record
and only 3,978,000 births last year. There were 338,000
(8 percent) fewer births in 2015 than in 2007, just before
the Recession began to influence fertility. This decline in
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births is entirely due to reduced fertility rates. The number of women in their prime childbearing years (20 to
39) actually increased by 2.5 million (6 percent) between
2007 and 2015. With more women of child-bearing age,
the expectation would be for more babies. Yet the larger
cohort of childbearing age women in 2015 produced
fewer births than the smaller 2007 cohort did. If the fertility rates of 2007 had been sustained through 2015, the
larger cohort of women of childbearing age would have
been expected to produce nearly 600,000 more children in
2015 than were actually born.
The recession and its aftermath had a particularly pronounced impact on the fertility of younger women. For
example, women 20 to 29 had 468,000 (19 percent) fewer
babies in 2015 than would have been expected had the
fertility levels of 2007 been sustained (see Figure 2). This
sharp reduction in births was due to lower fertility rates
among this age group. There were actually 1,624,000 (8
percent) more women who were 20 to 29 in 2015 than
there were in 2007. The fertility rate decline was greater
for women 20 to 24 (-27 percent), but it was substantial
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FIGURE 2. MANY FEWER BIRTHS THAN EXPECTED FOR
YOUNG WOMEN AND SLIGHTLY MORE BIRTHS FOR
OLDER WOMEN, 2015

Analysis: K.M. Johnson, Carsey School, University of New Hampshire
Source: National Center for Health Statistics

for women 25 to 29 (-12 percent) as well. Fertility rates for
women in their 20s declined for all racial groups, but the
decline was greatest for young Hispanic women. An even
greater fertility decline (-46 percent) occurred to women
10 to 19. Though this age group has far fewer births than
those in their 20s, the substantial fertility rate decline
among these very young women resulted in 197,000 fewer
births in 2015 than would have been expected had 2007
fertility rates prevailed. Because teenage mothers and their
babies face significant health, economic, and social challenges, this decline in teen births between 2007 and 2015 is
considered a positive change.
Fertility rates among women 30 to 39 actually increased
slightly (3 percent) between 2007 and 2015. This is in sharp
contrast to the substantial fertility rate declines among
younger women. There were nearly 5 percent more 30 to 39
year old women in 2015 than in 2007, so more births to this
group would be expected—but slightly higher fertility rates
produced an additional 50,000 more births than expected
among this age group. Fertility rates increased slightly for
women 30 to 39 among all racial groups, except Hispanics.
Economic recessions often temporarily reduce fertility both
because there are fewer young, high fertility immigrants and
because families and individuals under economic stress struggle to balance their work and family responsibilities. Women
often postpone marriage and childbearing in such uncertain
times. This is a particularly viable option for young women
because they have long fertility horizons. Older women have
less opportunity to delay. A critical question right now is: have
women just delayed births because of the Great Recession and
its aftermath, or will they forego these births entirely? There is
currently no clear answer to this question. Women who were

20 to 29 in 2008 are now 27 to 36. If they just delayed children, we would expect a significant rise in fertility rates for
those in their late 20s and 30s soon. There is no evidence
of this in the recently released NCHS data. The modest
increase in fertility rates among women in their 30s to date
is insufficient to make up the 3.4 million birth shortfall.
Birth rates must rise substantially and soon to make up a
significant proportion of this birth dearth.
The United States has not experienced an economic
displacement of the magnitude of the recent recession
in two generations. The Great Depression of the 1930s
also had a substantial and lasting impact on U.S. fertility. Young women who entered their childbearing years
early in the Depression also delayed having children.
The net result for them was extremely low lifetime fertility and the highest level of childlessness ever recorded.
In essence, they never fully recovered from delaying
their fertility during the Depression. It is too early to
determine yet what implications this recession will have
for long term U.S. fertility. But whether they are just
delayed or foregone, the 3.4 million missing births so far
mean there are currently many empty beds in maternity
wards, less business for firms in the baby industry, and
many empty seats in kindergarten classrooms.

Data
Fertility rates are calculated by dividing the number
of births to mothers in a given age group by the total
number of women in that age group. To estimate the
impact of the recession on births, newly released birth
data for 2015 from the National Center for Health
Statistics (NCHS) were merged with historical NCHS
birth data and combined with Census Bureau annual
estimates of the female population of childbearing age.
Pre-recessionary fertility was estimated by multiplying
2007 age-specific fertility rates for women 15 to 49 by the
actual number of women in each five year age cohort for
each year from 2008 to 2015. These expected births were
then compared to the actual births in that year reported
by NCHS. The difference between the two estimates the
effect of the recession and its aftermath on births.
About the Author
Kenneth M. Johnson is senior demographer at the Carsey
School of Public Policy and professor of sociology at the
University of New Hampshire (ken.johnson@unh.edu).
Acknowledgments
The author thanks Michael Ettlinger, Amy Sterndale, Curt
Grimm, Michele Dillon, Bianca Nicolosi, and Laurel Lloyd
at the Carsey School of Public Policy at the University of
New Hampshire for their comments and suggestions.

